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BY CHAR MILLER
As we struggle at the turn of the century to define and implement “sustainable forestry”—
the next stage in the evolution of forest management in North America and the world—it is important 
to realize that its components have strong roots in the forestry profession. This article examines the 
relationship of forests and forestry with social equity issues during the last century. In the end, 
the author leaves us with a question: can sustainable forestry as we understand it today lead 
to conflict resolution? If not, what lies beyond sustainable forestry?
Back to the
Garden 
THE REDEMPTIVE PROMISE OF SUSTAINABLE FORESTRY, 
1893–2000
It says something about our culture that a pair of ice cream moguls—Ben andJerry—could scoop the forestry profession by making “sustainability” a house-hold term. Who would have thought a rich, sweet, and frozen combination ofvanilla ice cream, cashews, and Brazil nuts, and dubbed “Rainforest Crunch,” 
could be successfully marketed in  as a way to preserve the
folkways and livelihoods of the indigenous peoples of the equa-
torial woodlands of Brazil? Or that this gastronomic concoc-
tion, which annually utilizes in excess of  tons of Brazil nuts,
all of which are “sustainably harvested from the most biolog-
ically diverse regions” of the Amazon, would feed first-world
consumers hungry for social relevance, environmental justice,
and a bit of butterfat?1
It says something, too, about the depth of our cultural mem-
ory that we may not recognize just how derivative are the argu-
ments of these caring capitalists; Ben and Jerry were not the first
to define the intersection between forest management, economic
development, and social equity. That honor surely belongs to
those who brought the concept of forestry to the United States
in the late-nineteenth century, individuals who fully appreciated
that this science could be a profound agent for political change
and social reform. It is with their belief in the socially ameliora-
tive aspects of forestry that this essay is particularly concerned.
Offering an intellectual history of sustainable forestry as social
uplift, it tracks foresters’ faith that through the development of
new land management techniques a better America would
emerge wherein some of its most disadvantaged and marginal-
ized citizens would be elevated with the stroke of an axe. As these
reformers would discover, however, the path to such sustained
change was never easy and only rarely realized.
IN THE BEGINNING
Among those who recognized the impact that forestry might
have on the commonweal and on its poor and downtrodden,
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and who was drawn to the field as a consequence, was Gifford
Pinchot. His training in Europe in  and —he studied
at the French national school of forestry and had traveled
throughout the continent evaluating forests and foresters—
had stimulated his perception of the profession’s democratic
potential, in ways both negative and positive. In correspon-
dence to his parents and later in his autobiography, Breaking
New Ground, Pinchot revealed he was particularly offended by
the elitist quality of Prussian forestry, by its practitioners’ dis-
dain for the common people. While touring a forest near
Neupfalz, for example, he witnessed a scene he never forgot:
“the old peasant who rose to his feet from his stone-breaking,
as the Oberfoerster came striding along,” he wrote, “and stood
silent, head bent, cap in both hands, while the official stalked
by without the slightest sign that he knew the peasant was on
earth.” In stark contrast were his experiences in Switzerland
which, like the United States, “was not an autocracy.” Under
the tutelage of Forstmeister Meister, who oversaw Zurich’s
famed Sihlwald forest, the young American (he was not yet
twenty-five) came to understand “the qualities a pioneer pub-
lic forester must have to succeed in a country like ours—prac-
tical skill in the woods, business common sense, close touch
with public opinion, and an understanding of how and why
things get done in government and politics in a democracy.”2
These formative European experiences came into play two
years later when Pinchot secured his first full-time job as a
forester, working for one of the nation’s wealthiest citizens—
George W. Vanderbilt. Beginning in the winter of , Pinchot
began to develop a forest management plan for Vanderbilt’s
sprawling estate Biltmore, situated just outside Asheville, North
Carolina. About that “magnificent chateau of Indiana lime-
stone,” he would later observe: “as a feudal castle it would have
been beyond criticism, and perhaps beyond praise. But in the
United States of the nineteenth-century and among the one-
room cabins of the Appalachian mountaineers, it did not
belong.” That contrast, he affirmed, was a “devastating com-
mentary on the injustice of concentrated wealth. Even in the
early nineties I had a sense enough to see that.”3
That he was sensitive to some of the gross inequities of the
so-called Gilded Age was remarkable, given that he too had
been born into a family of great means and considerable influ-
ence. More striking still was the significance of a forest man-
agement plan he then crafted in his spare time, not for his
employer, but for the indigenous people of the Appalachians—
the Cherokees—who labored under even greater disadvantages
than the region’s poor white population. In early February,
, he tramped over a site the Indians owned, “about thirty-
three thousand acres of mountain land, almost wholly covered
with forest.” As he wrote his father: “Parts of it are finer than
any other deciduous woodland I have ever seen, and other
parts of it, which I did not see, are said to be finer still.” He
was staggered by the size of some of the trees: the chest-high
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For almost ten years Ben and Jerry marketed Rainforest Crunch as a way to preserve the lifestyle of indigenous peoples in the 
woodlands of Brazil.
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circumference of one chestnut was ’”; poplars measured
up to ’, and a red oak was over ’—“the largest tree of the
kind I have ever seen.” But disaster threatened this arboreal
heaven. A local lumber agent had signed a contract with the
Cherokee to cut the vast tract, and had been aided in the nego-
tiations by “certain politicians who are anxious to handle the
money.” Pinchot was worried that this agent and his political
contacts, to feather their nests, would clearcut the woods, lead-
ing to the Cherokees’ impoverishment.4
Conceding that “there is a great deal of ripe timber on the
land,” Pinchot nonetheless considered it “a great pity” that the
“rest of the forest should be more or less sacrificed to the
removal of the small portion which ought rightly to be cut.”
Rather than sell the lumber in one fell swoop, “which would
of course mean disastrous injury to the forest on account of
the way lumbermen do their work,” he proposed an alterna-
tive that would lead to the “permanent preservation of the for-
est and the enrichment of the Indians.” Drawing on his
European training and his recent practical experience at
Biltmore, he suggested that the forest be divided roughly into
thirty or forty sectors, “in one of which the cutting would be
done each year. By the time the last section had been cut over,
the younger trees left standing on the first section would be
ready for market.” But only if the lumber company selectively
harvested the forest. “The success of this plan would depend
very largely on the way the timber was handled. That is, extra
care would be necessary in felling and getting out the logs, as
well as in selecting the trees to fall. But the cost of such extra
care, as the experiment at Biltmore has proved, is compara-
tively slight, while the difference which it makes in the future
of the forest is enormous.”5
Considerable too were the potential social ramifications of
his plan. If adopted, it would insure that there “would be a con-
stant annual revenue coming in to the Indians,” simultaneously
enhancing the material life of the tribe and reducing the “tax
on the Government for their support.” Just as “certain villages
in Europe pay all their school and road taxes from the product
of their forest, so it seems to me this band of fifteen hundred
Indians might go far to pay for the necessary improvements
about their village by the rational handling of this magnificent
forest.” From such an outcome psychological benefits would
also flow: the Cherokee would be “elevated by the influence
of steady and responsible work, ” he wrote in the paternal lan-
guage of nineteenth-century reform. Late-twentieth century
forestry reformers might balk at the implicit condescension,
but they should not mistake the larger thrust of Pinchot’s argu-
ment. In imagining a scenario in which sustainable forestry, a
rising standard of living, and political empowerment were inex-
tricably linked, Pinchot had devised a way by which to enfran-
chise the Indian peoples of western North Carolina so that
they did not resemble a degraded Prussian peasantry.6
Nothing came of Pinchot’s proposal; there is no evidence
that he submitted it to the relevant local or national authori-
ties, and, besides, he was outside the system of governance
that determined the Cherokee’s economic life. But once on
the inside, once he had become the chief of the Bureau of
Forestry in 1898, he dusted off his earlier plan, and began to
articulate a policy in which forestry would grapple with the
many needs of Native Americans. In the late s, for instance,
he became deeply involved in the creation of the first
Minnesota National Forest. As with his earlier scheme in the
North Carolina, the new forest was designed in part to halt
political corruption that had led to the outright theft of
Chippewa-owned timber and land, and the backroom deals
that had robbed the Chippewa of their rightful profits.7
Such widespread fraudulence also led Pinchot to seek a
closer relationship with the Indian Office in the Department
of Interior; in , as head of the Forest Service, he forged
an alliance with the Office that had control over ,,
acres of forest containing timber whose worth Pinchot esti-
mated was ,,. “No one in the Indian Office or one
the ground was capable of handling these forests,” he assert-
ed, and the “result was what you might expect.” Throughout
the nation, Indian peoples “were being cheated right and left
by contracts unduly favorable to the purchasers of Indian tim-
ber” or by the “failure of Indian Agents to enforce such con-
tracts as they had.” In addition, most forests were simply
clear-cut, making for a tremendous loss of young growth that
decreased the chances of natural regeneration; that there were
no provisions for reforestation only made matters worse. But
nothing struck him as more absurd and devastating than the
story he had heard of an Indian Agent whom had “sold for
lumber the sugar bush upon which his Indians depended for
their maple syrup.” The Indian Office, he determined, had no
sense either of conservative forestry or the social benefits that
accrued from it.8
The Forest Service, by contrast, recognized that the con-
nection between land management and political reform could
produce substantial results. Eighteen months after inking a
contract with Interior officials to handle the reservations’
forests, the chief would boast that his agency had “saved large
sums of money to the Indians, gave many of them profitable
employment, and by the introduction of Forestry promised to
make that employment permanent.” These first steps would
help those he considered to be the original conservationists,
who once had handled natural resources with “foresight and
intelligence,” to do so again.9
While Pinchot followed his overwhelming desire to “make forestry
pay,” and took his first forestry job with George Vanderbilt in
western North Carolina; he also commented on the “injustice of
concentrated wealth” that he saw at the Biltmore Estate.
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His idea was never fully implemented: in , Richard
Ballinger, who recently had been appointed as Secretary of the
Interior, put a halt to the working arrangement between the
Forest Service and Indian Office, a move that infuriated Pinchot;
it proved to be one of the sources of the later Ballinger-Pinchot
controversy that so devastated the Taft administration in .
Not for another twenty years, the chief forester believed, would
the idea that Indian forests should be “handled not for the prof-
it of political contractors, but for the lasting benefit of the
Indians and the rest of us” regain political ascendance.10
MID-LIFE REFLECTIONS
His belief was not entirely accurate, for in the interim there
were important attempts to establish conservation and forestry
on reservation lands. A central figure in these initiatives was 
J. P. Kinney. Trained in forestry and law at Cornell University, he
entered the employee of the Indian Forest Service (IFS) in ,
precisely at the wrong time. Caught in the crossfire between the
Department of Interior, in which the IFS was housed, and the
Forest Service, Kinney found his first years extremely exacting;
Interior employees, he later recalled, thought because he was a
forester he must be a “Pinchot man”; those in the Forest Service
considered him untrustworthy due to his employment in Interior.
Collateral controversies within Interior further confounded
Kinney’s labors: “I had a hard row to hoe for a while.”11
He plowed on nonetheless. Although he believed “the young
fellows in the Forest Service were over-idealistic,” he shared their
critique of his Interior predecessors’ actions: “Soon after I began
with the Indian Service,” he remembered, “I learned that the
things that had been done on the Indian lands were not wise.
Therefore, my sympathies were with the Forest Service, as far
as forestry went.” That led him to espouse selective cutting to
produce a steady stream of revenue for the tribes. On the
Menominee reservation in Wisconsin, the Klamath in Oregon,
and throughout the west, the understaffed and under budgeted
agency sought to make the case that clear-cutting forests was
bad science, poor economics, and misguided social policy. “The
attitude of the lumber industry in Wisconsin, as well as that of
the Menominee Indians, was very hostile to the introduction of
lumbering methods involving the expenditure of funds for future
forests if the effect was to reduce current income.” A turning
point came, he claimed, when he learned that a local, white-
owned lumber operation had been conservatively and profitably
harvesting its lands for some time. “I used the fact that the
Goodman Lumber Company was adopting selective cutting to
convince the Menominee Indians that it was practical.”12
His claim only partly convinces. The Menominee had a prag-
matic set of reasons of their own for pursuing this “new” cut-
ting strategy, and it pre-dates Kinney’s assertions by many years.
In the s, deeply concerned that white timber interests,
known locally as the “Pine Ring,” were illegally and destruc-
tively harvesting on the reservation, the tribe established a com-
mittee to defend its interests; it regularly filed complaints with
the Department of the Interior about the clear-cut depreda-
tions, and subsequent loss of income. Seeking to retain con-
trol of the resources on its property, and to develop an internal
skilled labor force, the Menominee constructed a sawmill and
lumber camp in the early s; from this enterprise, the tribe
gained considerable experience and financial rewards. Its bid
for self-sufficiency in this instance was short-lived—the feder-
al government ordered the logging to cease in —but it was
exactly this kind of outcome that led to continued agitation
through the last decades of the nineteenth and early-twenti-
eth centuries for greater control over its lands and their pro-
ductive capacity. In response to these demands, the La Follette
Act of  granted the Menominee the right to commercial-
ly log and mill timber, under the supervision of the USDA
Forest Service. In arguing on behalf of the bill that would bear
his name, Wisconsin Senator Robert La Follette enthused: “The
forest is the natural home of these men. They are what is
known as ‘Timber Indians.’ Their every instinct teaches them
to seek a livelihood from within the forest.” That instinctive
response would be guided by a desire to insure a sustained
yield. In these northern woods, “the harvest of the crop of for-
est products should be made in such a way that the forest will
perpetuate itself; that it shall remain as a rich heritage to these
people from which, through their own labor, they may derive
their own support, and that, too, without ruthless destruction.”
His words spoke for many—though not all Menominee—a
convergence that suggests that when Kinney voiced similar
arguments years later, his words fell on already-receptive ears.13
That Kinney’s interpretation of events framed the
Menominee as a naive people forever acted upon by more
sophisticated whites suggests the degree to which his per-
spectives on the prospects of American Indians diverged from
other foresters. He allowed that he was considerably more
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J. P. Kinney was Director of the Division of Forestry, Bureau of
Indian Affairs from  to . Kinney was an early advocate of
selective cutting on tribal lands.
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skeptical than visionaries like Pinchot, and by extension La
Follette, whom he felt over-estimated the noble character of
American Indians and who over-emphasized the role the fed-
eral government should play in their restoration. In A Continent
Lost—A Civilization Won (), Indian Forest and Range (),
and a memoir, My First Ninety-Five Years (), he loudly pro-
claimed the virtues of complete assimilation of Indian peoples
into the dominant white culture. His decades in the Indian
Service, he observed in his autobiography, had led him to “the
conclusion that the nourishing of the idea or notion in the
mind of the Indians that they should remain an insulated group,
separate from other inhabitants of the United States, consti-
tuted the greatest obstacle to their social and economic
advancement.” Disputing the well-established record that by
hook, crook, and purchase whites had absorbed prime Indian
lands, believing that such transfers were not necessarily bad in
any event because they forced Native Americans to come into
greater contact with prevailing cultural values and social norms,
Kinney insisted reservations were traps. Never snared like those
do-gooders whom he brushed off as “short haired women and
long haired men,” he wrote A Continent Lost—A Civilization
Won in eager rebuttal of what he described as the “urgent pro-
paganda” of one of these starry-eyed idealists, his superior in
the Indian Service, John Collier.14
Collier, whom President Franklin Roosevelt had tapped to
be the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, apparently was unruf-
fled by his subordinate’s contrariness; Kinney remembered
showing his boss the manuscript for A Continent Lost-A
Civilization Won, and Collier merely shrugged, and suggested
he “Go ahead and publish it.” The commissioner was unfazed
because, like Pinchot before him, he was convinced that more
needed to be done for the Indian peoples, including a renewed
emphasis on land reform and conservative forestry. The link
with Pinchot is not gratuitous; Kinney, for one, believed the
two men were similar types of crusaders. The campaign Collier
launched became known as the Indian New Deal, the essen-
tial characteristics of which he sketched out in the initial, heady
days of Roosevelt’s first term.15
In collaboration with his Special Advisor, forester Ward
Shepard, and Robert Marshall, then chief of the Indian Forest
Service, Collier outlined a bold plan to alter the status of the
Native American peoples. They went public with their ideas in
an article in the Journal of Forestry, the title of which—“The
Indians and Their Lands”—captured the authors’ desire to
reestablish Indian rights to possess indigenous grounds; as the
authors acknowledged, the “Indian forest problem is only one
phase, though an extremely important one, of the whole Indian
land problem.” At its heart lay the Allotment Law of , which
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A  logging crew, Camp Seven; Menominee Indian Reservation, Neopit, Wisconsin; Enos Gale, Foreman. 
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had commanded that tribal lands be distributed to 
individual members of the community so as to transform “the
Indian into a responsible, independent, self-supporting American
citizen by the over-simple expedient of mandatorily applying
to him the individualistic land tenure of the nineteenth-centu-
ry white American.” The consequences were devastating, indeed
the exact opposite of the stated purpose of the allotment law:
with the loss of more than 63 million acres, “much of it the
best” once under their control, the Indian peoples had become
“landless,” deprived “in large measure, of their chief means of
support without substituting any other means in its place.” A
miserable failure, the allotment policy demonstrated just how
“dangerous it is to try to solve problems by theories not sound-
ly based on the facts of life and nature.”16
Repairing this damage required a new approach and a dif-
ferent set of assumptions. Collins, Shepard, and Marshall pro-
posed to consolidate or restore as much land as possible to
communal ownership, utilizing land exchanges, purchase, and,
where possible, relinquishment of allotments. This dramatic
shift in land tenure on the reservations would be combined
with ongoing training in the management of forested lands.
The authors envisioned a harvesting system much as Pinchot
had forty years earlier, in which “a light selection method of
cutting” would be employed, one that would remove “not more
than fifty per cent of the volume of the stand.” This would
leave “sufficient growing stock to make it profitable to return
for at least one and perhaps several additional cuttings before
the end of the rotation.” And, again like Pinchot, they believed
that such a logging strategy would work for the forest and for
the people who depended on it: “The operation will…bring to
the Indians the power to manage their own affairs and the self-
respect which such power insures.”17
A similar restorative impulse was manifest in new arguments
emanating from the Forest Service about its future course. This
intellectual connection was not surprising, given that Collier’s co-
authors had been members of the Forest Service, and that they
were friends with Ferdinand A. Silcox, the new and fifth head of
the agency. Silcox believed that the forestry profession of the mid-
1930s was at a critical juncture. He urged his peers to recognize
that “[w]e must fit forestry into new economic and social condi-
tions. Twenty-five years ago, relatively few persons could foresee
the consequences of unbridled exploitation and over-develop-
ment of all resources. Now these consequences are so clearly evi-
dent that few deny them.” What that evidence of environmental
devastation had clarified was the need for a new philosophical ori-
entation that rejected “rugged individualism” because it often
gave license to “the strong to take advantage of the weak.” Instead,
arguing that forestry ought to be “an instrument for social and
economic betterment,” he proposed basing “our forest policy not
merely upon the need for timber, but also upon such other con-
siderations as stability of communities and employment, dove-
tailing of agriculture and forestry, and balanced use of land
resources.” His articulation of forestry’s communal responsibili-
ties, paired with his call for the profession to return its former
“crusading spirit of translating forestry ideals into actual life,” won
the praise of Gifford Pinchot, who was eager to help the new chief
realize their shared ambitions. To fight “side by side with a leader
like Silcox,” Pinchot wrote forester Raphael Zon, “is a grand
prospect, and I am perfectly delighted with it.”18
MATURING PRINCIPLES
Only a segment of foresters shared Pinchot’s enthusiasm,
embraced Silcox’s notion of forestry as “social service,” or
accepted Collier’s assumption that “intelligent, permanent land
use,” and “human understanding” were crucial to the resolu-
tion of the nation’s ruinous Indian policy. But many foresters
have come to do so, infusing these earlier arguments about eco-
nomic opportunity and social regeneration into late-twentieth
century sustainable forestry. “The definition of sustainable for-
est management that is now evolving,” V. Alaric Sample and
Roger A. Sedjo noted in , “requires meeting three condi-
tions simultaneously; it must be ecologically sound, economi-
cally viable, and socially responsible.” This blend is essential to
insure the success of a more ecosystemic form of land man-
agement, and reflects “a difficult lesson” that environmental-
ists learned at the end of the twentieth century in “developing
countries around the world”—that it is impossible to secure
“long-term protection of forest ecosystems without incorpo-
rating the economic and social needs of the local people into
conservation strategies.” Forestry and foresters must be as con-
cerned with sustaining the land as with the development of
“sustainable communities,” the two being parts of a whole.19
It is impossible to secure “long-term
protection of forest ecosystems
without incorporating the economic
and social needs of the local people
into conservation strategies.”
That characteristic of sustainability is vividly captured in the
 Principles and Criteria that the Forest Stewardship Council
(FSC) adopted in August, . FSC is an international organi-
zation whose membership has covered a spectrum of interest
groups, including environmentalists and foresters, representa-
tives from indigenous peoples organizations and timber com-
panies, as well as those involved in forest product certification.
To secure the FSC’s independent certification of forest products
as produced on lands managed according to a set of environ-
mental, social, and economic standards, producers must adopt
and demonstrate their adherence to the prescribed rules. This
entails, for example, complying with all applicable laws, estab-
lishing “long-term tenure and use rights” to the affected land,
enhancing “long-term social and economic well-being of forest
workers and communities,” conserving biological diversity, and
maintaining sites of “major environmental, social, or cultural
significance.” Of particular note, given some foresters’ concerns
in the past about links between exploitative commercial devel-
opment and social oppression, is FSC’s third principle—the
“Indigenous Peoples’ Rights.” Those organizations desiring FSC
sanction must recognize and respect the “legal and customary
rights of indigenous peoples to own, use and manage their lands,
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territories, and resources...,” which includes accepting that indige-
nous peoples “shall control forest management on their lands
and territories unless they delegate control with free and
informed consent to other agencies.” Additional constraints
involve the adoption of a forest management regime that “shall
not threaten or diminish, either directly or indirectly, the
resources or tenure rights of indigenous peoples,” protects sites
“of special cultural, ecological, economic or religious signifi-
cance,” and compensates indigenous peoples “for the applica-
tion of their traditional knowledge regarding the use of forest
species or management systems in forest operations.” Through
economic incentives and moral suasion, FSC hopes to empow-
er historically disadvantaged peoples, restore devastated wood-
lands, and develop a greener marketplace for forest resources.20
Judging by the increased support that FSC principles—and
others like them—have gained from among forest resource
professionals in academia, industry, and government, sustain-
able forestry appears to have entered a new stage in its devel-
opment. That is in part because it has become a matter of
international significance, a logical outcome of the location of
many of the affected forests—in the tropics and within Third
World nations. Consistent with this globalization of the idea
of sustainable forestry, is the growing concern for the main-
tenance of indigenous peoples and the rainforests within which
they live. Much of these worries, echoing nineteenth-century
concerns about the disadvantaged, revolve around the use of
economic systems and political reform to conservatively man-
age the land so as to enhance aboriginal power within an
intensely global system of trade. 
Intriguingly, some late-twentieth century scholars and envi-
ronmental activists have also turned this argument on its head.
Noting, for instance, that most “Amazonian Indians continue
to be like their forebears—they are still Indians—certainly in
terms of the their plant resources and the ways in which they
use and manage these,” William Balée compares their land
management techniques with those of the developed world:
“The resource management practices of the indigenous farm-
ers and foragers of Amazonia of today are less destructive of
the environment, by any measure, than our rapacious nation-
states with economies based on the burning of fossil fuels.” It
is not they, he argues, who are responsible for the industrial
poisoning of rivers and lakes, not they who are complicit in
the “increasingly apparent scenario of major biotic depletions.”
That being the case, he and others suggest that First World
conservationists “rethink their premises,” and recognize that
their drive to protect Amazonian lands and peoples has two
purposes—to insure the maintenance of the rainforest biota
and human ecology, and to increase their own chances for sur-
vival. “If modern states cannot protect the remaining Indian
villages and non-state societies of the world,” Balée concludes,
“will they ever be able to emulate them in terms of resource
management, and biological and ecological diversification?”
Apparently, sustainable forestry will save us all.21
What accounts for the greater receptivity to this claim of sal-
vation in fin-de-siècle America? There are myriad factors, perhaps
most prominent of which has been the rise of environmentalism
in the United States since the early s. A social movement and
cultural critique that challenged “the dominant, development-ori-
ented current of post-war American society,” it has emerged as a
powerful force in an increasingly affluent culture in which “qual-
ity of life” issues have come to define the political landscape.
Strengthened by certain seminal texts—e.g., Rachel Carson’s Silent
Spring and Paul Ehrlich’s The Population Bomb—and reinforced
through battles over natural landmarks such as Dinosaur National
Monument, the movement helped launch a series of new feder-
al environmental initiatives; the Wilderness Act (), National
Environmental Policy Act (), and the Endangered Species Act
(), among others, have transformed the way many Americans
think about their place in the world.22
In the ’s, Ferdinand A. Silcox, the fifth Chief of the U.S. Forest
Service, urged that forestry needs to fit within new economic and
social conditions.
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That these thoughts have led to intense political struggles
over, even gridlock on, pressing land management issues, has
been all too evident at century’s close. Surely this is yet anoth-
er compelling reason why contemporary foresters—a large
cohort of whom have come of age in this environmental era—
have been drawn to idea of “sustainability.” For them, it seems
to represent an enticing middle ground on which competing
forces can meet to discuss and perhaps resolve any number of
essential, if occasionally contradictory, needs. Some of its lure
for “advocates of sustainable development,” as William DeBuys’
has pointed out, lies in their faith “that economic use of envi-
ronmental resources can be made compatible with good stew-
ardship of them,” and in their belief that this balance can be
maintained over the long run. Sustainability, and its attendant
language of consensus, is also alluring amidst the often brutal
rhetorical clashes over wilderness values, economic develop-
ment, and social justice. Speaking to this felt need to locate a
space in which the combatants could more safely meet, argue
their differences, and meld some of them was the motto of the
Seventh American Forest Congress, held in Washington, D.C.
in February —“Many Voices... A Common Vision.” That
through sustainability we might reach the promised land of
conflict resolution is made even more delicious knowing we
can accelerate our arrival there simply by purchasing a quart
of “Rainforest Crunch.”23
Char Miller is Professor of History, Trinity University, San Antonio,
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